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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COM-
PANY, a corporation; MOUNTAIN 
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a 
corporation; and THE MOUNTAIN 
STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9163 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN.TS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in Appellant's 
Brief is correct. However, Respondents wish to amplify 
the Statement of Facts in the following respects. 
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 provides that 
on the National System of Interstate and Defense High-
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ways the Federal government will reimburse the state 
for 90% of the cost of construction and such additional 
percentage of the remaining 10% of such cost in any 
state containing unappropriated and unreserved public 
lands and non-taxable Indian lands, exceeding 5% of the 
total area of all lands therein, equal to the percentage 
that the area of such lands in such State is of its total 
area. 
Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1957, Section 27-2-7 (22), 
UCA 1953, provides not only that the appellant will pay 
the costs incurred by a utility incident to relocating its 
facilities when the same becomes necessary by reason 
of Federal-Aid highway construction, but also provides 
that such payment shall be limited to those cases where 
"proportionate reimbursement of such cost may be 
obtained by the State of Utah from the Unitea States 
pursuant to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956." 
This statute further provides that the term "cost of 
relocation" shall include "the entire amount paid by such 
utility properly attributable to such relocation after de-
ducting therefrom any increase in the value of the new 
facility and any salvage value derived from the old 
facility." 
POINT I. 
SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, WAS INTENDED 
TO REIMBURSE PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY 
AND COOPERATIVELY OWNED UTILITIES, 
INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION 
SYSTEMS AND UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS FOR THE COST 
OF RELOCATING THEIR FACILITIES ON 
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FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY PROJECTS AND 
TO ALLOW THE STATE OF UTAH TO AC-
CEPT FEDERAL AID AVAILABLE FOR 
SUCH PURPOSES. 
POINT II. 
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUB-
LICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVEL.Y 
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAIN-
AGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND 
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS FOR RELOCATION OF FA-
CILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER 
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, IS A CONSTITU-
TIONAL EXERCISE OF THE POLICE 
POWER BY THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT III. 
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUB-
LICLY, PRIVAVTELY AND COOPERA-
TIVELY OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING 
DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
AND UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITI-
CAL SUBDIVISIONS, FOR RELOCATION OF 
FACILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER 
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE A LENDING OF THE CREDIT OF 
THE STATE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 
VI, SECTION 31 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. 
POINT IV. 
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUB-
LICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVELY 
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAIN-
AGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND 
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS FOR RELOCATION OF FA-
CILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER 
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53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, DOES NOT RE-
LEASE OR EXTINGUISH AN INDEBTED-
NESS, LIABILITY OR OBLIGATION IN VIO-
LATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 27 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
SECTION 27-2-7 (22), UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, WAS INTENDED 
TO REIMBURSE PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY 
AND COOPERATIVELY OWNED UTILITIES, 
INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION 
SYSTEMS AND UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS FOR THE COST 
OF RELOCATING THEIR FACILITIES ON 
FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY PROJECTS AND 
TO ALLOW THE STATE OF UTAH TO AC-
CEPT FEDERAL AID AVAILABLE FOR 
SUCH PURPOSES. 
Under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 
23 U.S.C.A., § 101, et seq., the scope and nature of the 
Federal-Aid highway program was drastically changed. 
"A crash program of unprecedented scale was inaugu-
rated." S. Rep. No. 1407, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 53. 
Recognizing the impact which the greatly expanded 
highway program was having upon utilities and the fact 
that neither the utilities nor their subscribers, as such, 
were receiving any benefit therefrom, the Congress over 
seven years ago began a series of hearings on the prob-
lem with the result that in the Feedral-Aid Highway Act 
of 1956 there was included an express provision that, 
when permitted under state law, utility relocation costs 
are allowable as a part of the cost of the highway project 
and federal funds may be used to reimburse the states for 
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the payment of those costs in the same proportion as fed-
eral funds are expended on the rest of the project. 
This provision is found at 23 U.S.C.A., § 123, and 
provides that : 
"When a State shall pay for the cost of relo-
cation of utility facilities necessitated by the con-
struction of a project on the Federal-Aid primary 
or secondary systems or on the Interstate Sys-
tem, including extensions thereof within urban 
areas, Federal funds may be used to reimburse 
the State for such cost in the same proportion as 
Federal funds are expended on the project. Fed-
eral funds shall not be used to reimburse the State 
under this section when the payment to the utility 
violates the law of the State or violates a legal 
contract between the utility and the State .... " 
In order to qualify for federal participation, the 
Federal Bureau of Public Roads requires that "the State 
certifies that payment for the utility relocation is not 
in violation of the laws of the State or any legal contract 
between the utility and the State. If there should be any 
question as to the State's authority to pay for such re-
location, the State may be required to cite or establish its 
authority to pay for such relocation." U. S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Policy and Pro-
cedure Memorandum 30-4, Sec. 3 (2). 
At common law, the courts have held that the util-
ity's easement in the highway, like all property rights, 
is always subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's 
police power, and that therefore utilities can be required 
to relocate at their own expense, any facilities located 
within the right of way of a public highway whenever 
the necessities of highway improvement require. 
5 
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Whether, even absent statutory modification, this 
common law rule would apply to relocations necessitated 
by projects on the Federal-Aid system is not entirely 
free from doubt. In view of the magnitude of these proj-
ects and the enormous expense involved, cases dealing 
with the local type of relocation known to the common 
law do not necessarily furnish support for the proposi-
tion that requiring utilities to relocate at their own 
expense on the Interstate, Primary or Secondary Sys-
tems would be a reasonable exercise of the police power. 
In order to remove any doubt and fully meet federal 
requirements, the legislatures of sixteen states, including 
Utah, have since 1956 enacted statutes expressly making 
the old common law rule inapplicable to the Federal-Aid 
highway system and providing for payment of relocation 
expenses by the state. 
The legislative history of the Federal-Aid Highway 
Act of 1956 establishes that it was intended to authorize 
the federal government to participate in the cost of re-
locating utilities' facilities necessitated by highway con-
struction whenever a state allows and pays such cost 
to the utility. The Report of the Conference of the House 
and Senate verifies this fact and recognizes the equity 
of reimbursing utilities. In Conference Report No. 2436, 
the conferees said : 
" ... the Bill as passed by the House and recom-
mended and accepted by the conferees recognizes 
the equity of reimbursing utilities for the cost 
of relocating facilities when required for Federal-
Aid highway projects. Further, this Section 
makes it clear that it is the intention of the federal 
government to assume its proportionate share of 
utility relocation cost whenever a state allows 
such costs." United States Code Congressional 
6· 
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and Administrative News, Vol. II, 84th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2899 ( 1956) . 
Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1957 (sometimes here-
inafter referred to as the "Relocation Law") and simi-
lar statutes were expected by Congress, as shown by the 
following statement made by Congressman McGregor of 
Ohio, in speaking on the Conference Report on the Fed-
eral-Aid Highway Bill (102 Cong. Rec. 9930, June 26, 
1956) : 
" ... Under the existing practice, Mr. Speaker, 
of the Bureau of Public Roads, federal funds 
may participate in utility relocation costs to the 
same extent as other construction costs without 
percentage limitations based on the state's appor-
tionment. This legislation encourages the states 
to review their contemporary status and take ob-
jective action in accordance with such review." 
(Emphasis added) 
The Legislature of Utah reviewed its "contempo-
rary status" and took "objective action in accordance 
with such review" by passing Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 
1957, 27-2-7 (22) UCA, 1953. 
II. 
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUB-
LICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVELY 
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAIN-
AGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND 
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS FOR RELOCATION OF FA-
CILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER 
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, IS A CONSTITU-
TIONAL EXERCISE OF THE POLICE 
POWER BY THE STATE OF UTAH. 
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Before taking up in detail the Appellant's specific 
attacks on the constitutionality of Chapter 53, we wish 
to point out that the cardinal factor in this case, which 
must be kept in mind in deciding the constitutional 
question, is that the Relocation Law was adopted in the 
exercise of the State's police power vested in the Legisla-
ture. It is universally recognized that the control of 
highways is a proper subject for the exercise of the police 
power and that this includes the regulation of the loca-
tion and relocation of utility facilities on the highways. 
Thus, in Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 230 U.S. 58, 72, the Supreme Court held that 
a reservation in an ordinance, granting to a telephone 
company an easement to occupy the streets, of the power 
to amend the ordinance as the necessities of the city may 
demand was 
". . . no more than a reservation of the police 
control of the streets and of the mode and manner 
of placing and maintaining the poles and wires 
incident to the unabridgeable police power of the 
city." 
In Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 N.W. 2d 
642, the Supreme Court of Minnesota said (at p. 656) : 
" ... The relocation, construction, or reconstruc-
tion of highways clearly relates to the safety, 
security, and general welfare of the citizens of 
the state, and all steps taken in furtherance of 
these objects-inclusive of the relocation of utility 
facilities upon rights-of-way-are matters within 
the police power of the state." 
Furthermore, it appears on the face of the statute 
that the exercise of the police power here involved has 
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taken the form of substantive legislation. Section 27-2-7, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, deals with the duties and 
powers of the State Road Commission. Subsection 22 of 
Section 27-2-7 confers upon the Commission the power, 
inter alia, to make reasonable regulations for the re-
location of utility facilities on Federal-Aid highways 
projects. It provides that the Commission may order such 
relocation, but expressly provides for the payment of 
cost of relocation as defined in the Act. 
The question before this Court thus concerns the 
validity of provisions of the substantive law, enacted by 
the Legislature in the exercise of the police power of the 
State. Its effect is clearly limited to relocations ordered 
by the Commission after the effective date of the Act. 
It does not purport to release any obligations which utili-
ties may have had in connection with past relocations of 
facilities. 
It follows that the only questions involved in this 
case are whether Chapter 53 constitutes a reasonable 
exercise of the police power and is constitutional. 
It is elementary that the Legislature has the power 
to fix the public policy of the state and that it possesses 
a wide range of discretion in the exercise of that power. 
It it equally well settled that the Legislature has control 
over public roads and highways in this state. 
In the instant statute, the Legislature has declared 
the public policy of the state by changing, for the future, 
the rule of law governing liability for the expense of 
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Every exercise by the Legislature of its power to 
establish the public policy and law of the state neces-
sarily changes the pre-existing law and the rights and 
obligations arising thereunder. That is the very essence 
of the legislative power. Appellant's position is that 
because prior to the enactment of Chapter 53, public 
utilities had the common law duty to relocate their facili-
ties at their own expense, the Legislature is powerless 
to change this rule of law for the future. Acceptance 
of this argument would, in effect, drastically curtail the 
power of the Legislature to legislate, and all rights and 
obligations existing under public law would remain 
permanently frozen in their present form. The Constitu-
tion does not compel so absurd a conclusion. On the con-
trary, it is well established that the police power, i.e., 
the power to make new laws and change or abolish old 
rules of law, can never be abdicated or bargained away, 
and is inalienable even by express grant. 
While the exercise of the police power, like all legis-
lative action, must be reasonable, there is a very strong 
presumption in favor of its constitutionality. Under 
familiar principles of law, a statute must be sustained 
unless its invalidity is apparent beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Where there exists any doubt as to the validity 
of a statute, the legislative action must be upheld and a 
decision of the Legislature accepted by the judicial 
department. 
This presumption of constitutionality of the Legis-
lature's exercise of the police power is so well established 
in Utah and in all other jurisdictions generally that no 
citations of authority are necessary. Consequently, 
Chapter 53 must be upheld unless it is without rational 
basis. Every doubt must be resolved in favor of its 
10 
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constitutionality . . . in no doubtful case will the ju-
diciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the 
Constitution; to doubt the constitutionality of a law is 
to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. 11 Am. Jur., 
Constitutional Law, § 92. 
". . . the rule is fixed that a party who alleges 
the unconstitutionality of a statute normally has 
the burden of substantiating his claim and must 
overcome the strong presumption in favor of its 
validity. It has been said that the party who 
wishes to pronounce a law unconstitutional takes 
on himself the burden of proving this conclusion 
beyond all doubt, and that a party who asserts 
that the legislature ... has violated the Constitu-
tion must affirmatively and clearly establish his 
position. . . . It is insufficient merely to raise a 
doubt or show that the legislation is unwise." 
11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 132 and cases 
cited there. 
Reimbursement of utilities for relocation expenses 
in connection with complex and costly highway projects 
antedates the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 which 
first officially sanctioned Federal participation in the 
reimbursement of such costs. Thus, for many years, 
statutes in California (Deering's California Codes, 1952, 
"Streets and Highways," §§ 700, et seq.) , Connecticut 
(Gen. Stats., 1949 Revision, Cum. Supp. 1953, Ch. 107, 
§ 971 (c)), and New Jersey (Stats. Ann. 1940 Cum. 
Supp. 1953, § 27:7 A-7) have provided for payment by 
the state of relocation costs on express ways. The con-
stitutionality of reimbursement under these statutes has 
apparently never been doubted. In addition, with one 
exception, all turnpike statutes expressly provide for 
reimbursement of utility relocation costs. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Alabama Code 1940 (1955 Supp.), Tit. 23, Sec. 
124(16)e; 
California Streets and Highways Code, Sec. 703; 
Connecticut Public Acts of 1957, Ch. 576; 
Florida Statutes 1957, Ch. 340, Sec. 340.07 (5) ; 
Illinois Smith-Hurd Stat. Anno. (1957 Supp.), Ch. 
121; Sec. 314a 34; 
Indiana Statutes ( 1957 Supp.), Sec. 36-3206; 
Kansas General Statutes ( 1957 Supp.), Ch. 68, Sec. 
68-2005; 
Kentucky Rev. Stat., Sec. 177.430 ( 5) and Laws 
1954, S.B. 137, Sec. 15; 
Louisiana Rev. Stat. ( 1957 Supp.), Tit. 48, Sec. 
1256; 
Maryland Anno. Code, Art. 89B, Sec. 145; 
Michigan ·stat •. Anno. (1957-Supp.), Tit. 9, Sec. 
9.1095(5); 
New Jersey Stat. Anno., Tit. 27, Sec. 12B-6; 
New York Highway Law, Sec. 346; 
North Carolina General Stat., Ch. 136, Sec. 
136-89.18; 
Ohio Page's Rev. Code Anno., Ch. 5537, Sec. 5537.05; 
Oklahoma Stat. ( 1957 Supp.) , Tit. 69, Sec. 67 4; 
Rhode Island General Laws 1956, Ch. 12, Sees. 
24-12-9 ( q) ; 
Texas Vernon's Civil Stat. (1957 Supp.), Art. 
6674v, Sec. 6; 
Vermont Laws1955, No. 270, H. B. 414, Sec. 4; 
Virginia Code of 1950, Tit. 33, Sec. 33-255.6; 
Wisconsin Stat. 1957, Sec. 59.965 (5) (h) 3. 
12 
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Thus, when Congress recognized the equity of reim-
bursing utilities for the cost of relocating facilities when 
required for Federal-Aid highway projects, there was 
not even a suggestion that any constitutional question 
might be involved. Indeed, Conference Report No. 2436, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess. makes it clear that the Congress did 
not make a new departure, but merely affirmed the long 
established practice of the Bureau of Roads in reimburs-
ing states which paid utility relocation expenses on 
Federal-Aid highways. 
By the same token, when 16 states adopted reim-
bursement provisions designed to cooperate with the 
Federal government in expediting the National System 
of Interstate and Defense Highways without imposing 
inequitable and in some instances unbearable burdens 
on utility users, they were merely following an estab-
lished public policy applicable to complex and costly 
limited access highway projects, the propriety of which 
had never been successfully challenged. In an exhaustive 
study published by the National Academy of Sciences-
Highway Research Board in 1955 as Special Report 21, 
entitled "Relocation of Public Utilities Due to Highway 
Improvement-An Analysis of Legal Aspects," the Board 
not only failed even to suggest that a constitutional ques-
tion might be involved, but unequivocally stated on page 
40 that the common law doctrine, under which utilities 
had to relocate at their own expense, specifically admits 
of legislative change. 
It follows that at the time of the enactment of Chap-
ter 53 and similar statutes, their propriety seemed estab-
lished beyond question. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that when shortly after the passage of the Federal-Aid 
13 
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Highway Act of 1956 the Legislatures of Maine and New 
Hampshire requested advisory opinions from their re-
spective Supreme Courts, the Justices had not the slight-
est difficulty in advising that the State could validly reim-
burse utili ties for relocation expenses. 
Following the Maine and New Hampshire opinions, 
the constitutionality of such statutes was nevertheless 
challenged in seven jurisdictions besides Utah. In four, 
it has been upheld. In Minnesota and Texas by the 
Supreme Court, and in Montana and North Dakota by 
the District Courts. In addition, the constitutionality of 
reimbursement for utility relocation costs was upheld 
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in connection with 
urban renewal projects in Wilson v. Long Branch, 142 
A. 2d 837, 84 7 ( 1958) . The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has recently stated with respect to reimbursement 
that the common law rule ... can and may be abrogated 
by a s~ecific statutory mandate directing the payment 
of relocation costs ... Delaware River-Port Authority v. 
Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, 145 A. 2d 172 
( 1958). In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has held that 
a statute providing for compensation for damages 
caused by the construction of a tunnel in Baltimore Har-
bor required the State Road Commission to reimburse 
utilities for relocation expenses. Baltimore Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. State Roads Commission, 134 A. 2d 312 
( 1957). 
Summarizing, we find that since 1957 reimburse-
ment of utilities for relocation expenses has been ap-
proved by the highest courts of the following states: 
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey,· Pennsylvania and Texas. Its constitutionality has 
14 
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been upheld by the lower courts of Montana and North 
Dakota. In addition, in Florida, Georgia, Nebraska and 
Oklahoma, the Attorneys General have ruled to the same 
effect. 
Unless the conclusion is accepted that all the legis-
lative bodies and courts acted unreasonably, it is im-
possible for the Appellant to sustain the burden of estab-
lishing that a legislative determination made by so many 
legislators and sustained by so many courts is invalid 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewed in the most favor-
able light, Appellant's arguments at best do no more 
than raise a doubt as to the constitutionality and wisdom 
of Chapter 53. But even if Appellant is successful in 
raising such doubts, it cannot prevail here under the ele-
mentary rules discussed, supra. 
It is submitted that the Appellant has not and can-
not sustain the burden of overcoming this presumption. 
Nevertheless, we shall show that it was eminently reason-
able for the Legislature to adopt Chapter 53. 
It is well established that the use of public highways 
by utilities for the location of their facilities is not only 
proper, but is required by the public interest. This court 
has stated that under Utah laws highways are devoted 
to the public use and are useful not only for surface 
transportation but also for utility purposes essential to 
the public welfare. In White v. Salt Lake City ( 1952), 
121 U. 134, 239 P. 2d 210, 214, the Court quoted with 
approval the following language of the Ohio Court: 
"' ... Some of the highways of our state were 
originally Indian paths or paths established by 
wild animals. By a process of evolution they suc-
cessively became foot-paths of the settlers, bridle 
15 
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paths, ways for pack animals, ways for horse-
drawn vehicles, ways for motor-propelled vehicles 
and electric street cars, ways for wires for tele-
phone and telegraph service and for the trans-
mission of electric energy, ways for pipes for 
water, sewage, gas, steam, hot water, and other 
utilities. 
* * * * * * * * 
" 'The evolution of public utilities and the wide-
spread and ever-increasing use of public utility 
service throughout the state have greatly varied 
the uses of streets and highways. It is doubtful 
whether this great variety of us·es has really in-
creased the burdens. The increased burdens upon 
the highways are caused primarily by the largely 
increased population, and the demands of the 
people for necessities, conveniences, and luxuries 
of modern living conditions .... It is hardly cor-
rect to say that by such new adaptations the· 
streets and highways are subjected to uses not 
contemplated when highways were laid out many 
years ago. It would be more correct to say that 
present uses are the progression and modern de-
velopment of the same uses and purposes. The 
new appliances are but rapid transit methods of 
supplying the modern wants of the people, the 
wires supplanting the messenger, the carrier and 
the postman, and the rails and pipe lines supplant-
ing in part the vehicular traffic.'" (Emphasis 
added by court) 
-The principle is further stated in the recent case of 
Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 N.W. 2d 642, 648 
(Minn. 1958) as follows: 
" ... The concept of the functional uses or pur-
poses of a highway has constantly expanded with 
the advancement of civilization until today a high-
way no longer exists for the limited though prin-
cipal, purpose of vehicular travel or transporta-
tion of persons and property. over its surface. . . . 
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" ... The soundness of the view that the placing 
of utility facilities upon a right-of-way is one of 
the proper uses of a highway benefiting the public 
is emphasized by the fact that convenience and 
economy result therefrom to utility users, who are 
usually located near highways, and by the further 
fact that, it is in the interest of the public welfare 
-in the view of our ever-increasing population-
to make full and efficient use of the land surface 
occupied by public roads." 
Direct recognition of the public interest in the use 
of the highways for utility facilities is found in Sections 
10-8-21 and 17-5-39, UCA, 1953, authorizing cities and 
counties to allow public utility corporations to use the 
streets and highways for their facilities. 
For many years, the joint use of the highways by 
vehicular traffic and the newer methods of communica-
tion caused no problem. Even though the invention of 
the automobile revolutionized the transportation of per-
sons and property, there was no real conflict of interest 
between this mode of transportation and utility facilities 
until after World War II, when an explosive increase in 
automobile traffic occurred. It was soon realized that 
this required a network of widened, high-speed, safe high-
ways, which is now being constructed with the aid of the 
Federal government. This expanded construction of 
Federal-Aid highways, with the consequent necessity 
of relocating utility facilities brought about not for util-
ity purposes, but solely to accommodate the demands of 
vehicular traffic, imposed a financial burden on utility 
companies that was beyond anybody's imagination at the 
time the common law rule requiring uncompensated re-
location was developed. It is not too much to say that when 
applied to the requirements of the vastly expanded Fed-
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
eral-Aid highway system of today, as contrasted with the 
purely local roads of the past, such rule has become 
unreasonable. It is for this reason that the Congress 
decided to encourage and facilitate reimbursement for 
relocation expenses. 
Let us briefly consider the alternatives which faced 
the 1957 Legislature. The cost of relocation caused by 
the construction of Federal-Aid highways had to be 
borne by someone, either the highway users through 
taxes or the utilities' users through higher rates. The 
rule that uncompensated relocation could be required 
flowed from the police power of the state over public 
highways and as we have pointed out, supra, the Legis-
lature has the power to change any such rule in the exer-
cise of the police power. There were very strong reasons 
why it would be not only equitable but in the public inter-
est, to change such rule of non-compensation for reloca-: 
tion expenses. 
A statement of some of these reasons is found in 
Senate Report No. 1407, 85th Cong. 2d Sess.: 
"It is submitted that there was valid reason 
for the States to amend their laws. The conditions 
under which utilities agreed to bear the burden of 
relocation costs disappeared, or at the very least 
were radically and substantially changed, with 
the enactment of Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1956. 
"In the old days, such relocation costs were 
encountered on a gradual and small scale. They 
embraced relatively minor operations in type. 
Their sum total was within the reach of the utili-
ties' ability to fund same, whether the utility was 
publicly, privately, or cooperatively owned. 
"Under the act of 1956 all of this was heavily 
18 
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changed. A crash program of unprecedented 
scale was inaugurated. Federal funds available 
for highway construction rocketed from $875,000 
to $2 billion within a single year. Greater in-
creases are scheduled for following years. In ad-
dition, the type of construction changed. The 
modern, multilane, high speed traffic ways require 
rights-of-way of spectacular width; cloverleafs, 
over-passes, and under-passes, and long distances 
thereof through urban areas, bringing express-
ways to the heart of metropolitan centers. 
"These changes brought about inordinate ex-
penditures for moving vast amounts of facilities 
at a great cost to the users of the utilities. They 
bring about a tremendously different treatment 
than when highway improvement was a local con-
venience and local cost, relatively speaking." U. S. 
Code Congressional and Administrative News, 
Vol. 2, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., P. 2396 (1958) 
In considering these factors, the Legislature was 
not concerned with the protection of stockholders or 
owners of public utility companies. Regulated utilities 
have no revenues other than the rates paid by their sub-
scribers from which to pay relocation expenses. Under 
the law of Utah, utilities are entitled to a fair return 
on the value of the property devoted to the public service. 
Relocation costs are an expense item chargeable to oper-
ating expenses or are capital expenses and thus increase 
the rate base on which utilities are entitled to earn. 
These factors have found express judicial recognition. 
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court said in Minneapolis 
Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra, (91 N.W. 2d at p. 652) : 
" ... If the utilities located in this state must 
undertake relocation of their facilities· without 
a right to reimbursement their costs will be sub-
stantially increased and this in turn will be re-




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Commission, 136 A. 2d 473, 477 (1957), reversed 
on other grounds, 145 A. 2d 538, the Court said: 
"The cost of relocating the utilities enters into 
the rate structure of the public utility companies, 
and is paid for by the companies' rate payers. It 
i~ error to intimate or suggest that such cost is 
borne by the officials or even the stockholders of 
the companies. The question of whether the cost 
of the required relocation of telephone poles 
erected upon the rights-of-way with authority of 
the Commonwealth, should be paid on the tele-
phone bills or at the gasoline pumps has been a 
matter of governmental concern for some years. 
" 
See also Delaware Port Authority v. Public Service 
Commission, 180 Pa. Super. 318, 119 A. 2d 855, 858 
( 1956) , where the Court said: 
". . . If the Electric Company were obliged to 
pay these and like costs at other crossings which 
will amount to a total of about $320,000, that 
utility would be entitled to add the amount to its 
rate base, to be recovered from its rate payers in 
addition to a fair return on the total expenditure 
over the life of the new facilities. The rate payers 
of the Electric Company as such will receive no 
benefit from the relocation of its facilities nor 
from the completion of the project and there is no 
reason why they should contribute to its cost. 
The bridge is an interstate link in a system of na-
tional highways. Tolls paid by those who use the 
bridge will be adequate to meet the entire costs 
incident to its construction. They will be the 
direct beneficiaries of the completed project and 
it is they alone who shall pay." 
Thus, the Legislature had to make a decision re-
garding the equitable allocation of these costs, arising 
out of the construction of Federal-Aid highways, between 
20 
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the users and rate payers of the local utility companies 
and the highway users. In making this decision, it found 
that the utility users would receive no improvement in 
service for the higher rates imposed on them and, in 
addition, they would be compelled to make a double 
contribution to the Federal-Aid highway program, once 
in their federal taxes, and a second time in higher utility 
rates. 
It can hardly be seriously argued that the Legisla-
ture is without power to choose a fair and equitable allo-
cation of relocation costs rather than an unfair and in-
equitable one. 
In view of the foregoing, the real question in this 
case is whether the Utah Constitution places the Legis-
lature in a position which would prevent it from changing 
the law not only in accordance with justice and equity, 
but also for compelling economic reasons. We submit 
that merely to state this question is to answer it. Never-
theless, we will now direct our attention to the specific 
constitutional objections raised in the Appellant's Brief 
to which we now turn. 
III. 
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUB-
LICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVELY 
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAIN-
AGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND 
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS, FOR RELOCATION OF FA-
CILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER 
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE A LENDING OF THE CREDIT OF 
THE STATE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 
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The Appellant contends that the Relocation Law 
violates Article VI, Section 31 of the Utah Constitution 
which provides : 
"The Legislature shall not authorize the State, 
or any county, city, town, township, district or 
other political subdivision of the State to lend its 
credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any 
railroad, telegraph or other private individual or 
corporate enterprise or undertaking." 
The purpose and effect of Article VI, Section 31 is 
to prohibit a business partnership between the state and 
individuals or private corporations. The basic test in 
determining whether a statute violates this section of the 
Constitution is whether the purported expenditure is for 
a private or public purpose. Wallberg v. Utah Public 
Welfare Commission, 115 U. 242,203 P. 2d 935. 
Thus, the question for decision is whether expendi-
tures for the costs of relocation of utility facilities are 
~xpenditures for a public purpose. That the answer must 
be in- the affirmative is clear for a number of reasons. 
At the outset, we wish to point out that the weight 
of authority is to the effect that payment of relocation 
expenses serves a valid public purpose. The following 
ju.risdictions uphold reimbursement of relocation ex-
penses as against attacks based on constitutional provi-
sions similar to Article VI, Section 31 of the Utah Con-
stitution: Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas. 
We have shown, supra, that the Relocation Law was 
enacted by the Legislature, in the exercise of the police 
power, to prescribe a substantive rule of law _for the 
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future. Thus, it is clear that if the Legislature repeals 
taxes for the future, this does not result in a gift, whereas 
the forgiving of past due taxes would be a gift. Another 
example may be mentioned. Every citizen, with certain 
statutory exceptions, is under a duty to render jury 
service. This duty could be compelled without compen-
sation. Nevertheless, Section 78-46-5, UCA 1953, pre-
scribes certain fees for jurors. These payments have 
been increased, the last increase to eight dollars per day 
being found in Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1949. Under 
the Appellant's view, the 1949 statute would be uncon-
stitutional because the state could have compelled jury 
service at the lower fee scale then in effect. But, of 
course, the 1949 statute created enforceable legal rights 
for the future, and payment of the increased fees and 
mileage is not a gift of public funds. A different situa-
tion would be presented if a statute attempted to author-
ize additional payments for jury service rendered prior 
to the effective date of the statute. 
It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature could 
validly create a legal right of reimbursement for the 
future and that payment of such legal claim cannot con-
stitute a gift. Indeed, the courts have expressly held that 
the common law rule governing relocation expenses is 
subject to statutory change. The most recent statement 
to this effect is found in the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania in Delaware River Port Authority 
v. Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, 145 A. 2d 
172, 175. The Court said: 
"This common law rule, however, can and may 
be abrogated by a specific statutory mandate 
directing the payment of relocation costs to the 
non-transportation utilities involved." 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Opinion of the Justices, 132 A. 2d 613, 615, the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire said: 
"The common-law rule which places the costs 
of relocating utility facilities on the owner 'spe-
cifically admits of legislative change.'" 
To the same effect is Westchester EleBtric R. Co. v. 
Westchester County Park Commission, 174 N.E. 660 
(N.Y. Ct. of App.). The Court said: 
"At common law, holders of franchises take the 
risk of the location of their structures in public 
highways and are bound to make such changes 
at their own charge as public convenience or se-
curity requires, but this common-law rule is sub-
ject to alteration by statute. Public security de-
mands that the driveway of a great park over 
which millions of motor vehicles proceed at a high 
rate of speed shall not cross city and village streets 
at grade. A statute imposing the expense of 
changes necessarily incidental to the elevation of 
such highways, upon the public body directing 
such changes would not conflict with any- consti.;. 
tutional prohibition. The inquiry is, therefore, 
directed to the existence of such a statute." (Em-
phasis added) 
Thus, if the Relocation Law is viewed as what it is, 
a prospective modification of a substantive rule of the 
common law, it becomes apparent that the allegation 
that it involves a gift of public funds is without 
substance. 
In Utah, as well as in almost every other state, 
utilities have long had authority to occupy public high-
ways for the purpose of providing necessary utility serv-
ices to the public. There are no judicial decisions holding 
that such grants are donations or gifts, but to the con-
trary such grants have been specifically upheld. 
24· 
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In State ex inf. McKittrick v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Company, 92 S.W. 2d 612 (Mo.), it was 
alleged that a statute giving telephone and telegraph 
companies the right to place their facilities on the high-
ways without payment was in violation of a constitu-
tional provision similar to Article VI, Section 31. 
The Court said : 
" ... The respondent is a public utility engaged 
in furnishing telephone service to the general 
public. The General Assembly no doubt consid-
ered that the benefit to the general public arising 
from the promotion of the extension of such serv-
ice justified the granting of the privilege of the 
use of the highways. While that benefit may not 
be said to be a formal consideration, as that term 
is generally understood, yet it is that benefit and 
that consideration which takes this grant out of 
the class of grants prohibited by the Constitution." 
And the theory thus followed in connection with 
these grants and their constitutional validity was reiter-
ated in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Union 
Electric Co. of Missouri, 142 S.W. 2d 1099 (1940); 
Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co. (Arkansas), 178 S.W. 2d 1002 (1944) 
and Los Angeles County v. Southern California Tele-
phone Company, 196 P. 2d 773. 
In Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that "the 
use of highway rights of way for the transmission of 
public intelligence and public utility services confers 
important and direct benefits upon the public and ... 
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These cases illustrate that the ban of constitutional 
provisions similar to Article VI, Section 31 does not fall 
upon the grant by the state, counties or cities to utilities 
of the use of public ways. The benefits flowing to the 
public from such uses of highway rights of way are 
apparent from an examination of Respondents' status. 
Respondents are utility companies engaged in the busi-
ness of furnishing communications, fuel and electric 
power to the public at just and reasonable rates; they 
are under a legal duty to serve the public; their business 
is affected with a public interest and results in public 
benefit. Use of highways for the location of Respondents' 
facilities promotes the extension of such service to the 
greatest number of people at th.e lowest reasonable cost. 
In Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Service Comm., 
101 U. 99, 118 P. 2d 683, 689, this Court said: 
"Thus the right to lay rail or pipes, or string 
wires or set poles along a public street is not an 
ordinary business in which everyone may eng~ge, 
or a use everyone may make of the street, but is 
a special privilege, a franchise to be granted for 
the accomplishment of public objects." 
If permitting a utility to use a.nd occupy portions 
of the rights of way of public highways is not a pro-
hibited lending of the credit of the state because of the 
public benefits which will result from the operation of 
such utility, why is it any less true that no prohibited 
lending of the credit of the state is involved when the 
state reimburses the utility for the cost of relocating its 
facilities, and thereby insures the continuance of service 
at reasonable rates. The cases, we respectfully urge, 
establish that the latter is permissible and, thus, we do 
not. fl.nd how it is debatable that the same public purpose 
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which supports the original grant also supports Chapter 
53. 
In Maine, the 1957 Legislature passed an act similar 
to Chapter 53. Article 9, Section 14 of the Maine Con-
stitution provides that "the credit of the State shall not 
be directly nor indirectly loaned in any case .... " In 
Opinion of the Justices, 132 A. 2d 440 ( 1957), the Court 
held that the Act did not violate this section of the Con-
stitution, saying at page 443: 
" ... At common law there is no obligation to 
pay for the removal or relocation of public utility 
facilities required by changes in highways. (Cit-
ing cases) The State, however, may in our view, 
pay for the cost of relocating such facilities, if it 
chooses to do so. The purpose of such expenditures 
is public in nature, and the extent and conditions 
under which the Sta-te may meet such costs are 
for the Legislature to determine." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court likewise ren-
dered an opinion upholding the constitutionality of a 
statute similar to Chapter 53 in Opinion of the Justices, 
132 A. 2d 613 ( 1957). The Court held that conceding 
that in absence of statute, utilities are obligated to re-
locate at their own expense, the Legislature has the power 
to relieve them of that burden and such legislative action 
did not violate the New Hampshire Constitution. The 
Court said at page 614: 
"While the obligation to remove or relocate 
utility facilities is placed on the owner by the 
common law, the Legislature may change this 
rule. (Citing cases) This principle was expressed 
in the recent Opinion of the Justices, Me. 132 A. 
2d 440 (decided May 6, 1957) as follows: 'The 
State, however, may, in our view, pay for the cost 
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of relocating such facilities, if it chooses to do so. 
The purpose of such expenditures is public .in 
nature and the extent and conditions under which 
the State may meet such costs are for the Legisla-
ture to determine.' The common-law rule which 
places the costs of relocating utility facilities on 
the owner 'specifically admits of legislative 
change.' Relocation of Public Utilities Due to 
Highway Improvement - An Analysis of Legal 
Aspects, Highway Research Board Special Report 
21, p. 40 (1955). If the Legislature decides to 
make such a change it would not be a violation of 
our Constitution, Part II, Article 5th or Part I, 
Article 10th. (Citing cases)" (Emphasis supplied) 
Contrary to the statement of Appellant on page 14 
of its Brief, both the Maine and New Hampshire Supreme 
Courts considered constitutional provisions similar to 
Article VI, Section 31. 
The Maine Constitution provides that "the credit 
of the state shall not be directly nor indirectly loaned 
in any case" and, as noted above, the Court held that 
the Relocation Law did not violate the Constitution. 
In New Hampshire the Court referred to Part II, 
Article 5th and Part I, Article lOth of the New Hamp-
shire Constitution. Both of these provisions relate to the 
giving or loaning of the credit of the state and in Opinion 
of the Justices (New Hampshire), 190 Atl. 425, the 
Court adopted the universal view that "money raised by 
taxation can be used only for public purposes and not for 
the advantage of private individuals." In quoting from 
Cooley, Taxation, page 90, the Court said: 
'' ... Taxation for the purpose of raising money 
from the public to be given or even loaned to pri-
vate parties, in order that they may use it in 
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their individual business enterprises, is not recog-
nized as for public use." 
With this clear cut precedent in mind regarding 
the use of public funds, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court nevertheless held that the statute allowing reim-
bursement to utilities of their relocation expenses was 
not a gift or a lending of the credit of the state. 
In Minneapolis Gas Co. v. L. P. Zimmerman, supra, 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a statute iden-
tical in legal effect to Chapter 53. The Minnesota statute 
was passed by the Legislature in 1957 and its purpose 
was to take advantage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act 
of 1956 which had been recently enacted by Congress. 
The Minnesota Constitution, Article IX, Section 10, 
almost identical with Article VI, Section 31 of the Utah 
Constitution, provides that "the credit of the state shall 
never be given or loaned in aid of any individual, associa-
tion or corporation, . . . " 
In construing this provision of the Constitution, the 
Court said (page 6 51 ) : 
"In short, public funds shall be used solely for 
public purposes and shall never be used, or en-
cumbered by pledging the state's credit, in the 
furtherance of any private purpose or in the aid 
of any private individual or entity." 
The Court further said: 
"We have already pointed out that the use of 
rights of way by utilities for locating their facili-
ties is one of the primary purposes for which 
highways are designed, even though their prin-
ciple use is for public travel and transportation of 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
persons and property. It follows that where it 
becomes reasonably necessary to relocate such 
utility facilities in order to improve the highway 
for public travel ... an expenditure of funds to 
effect such relocation is properly a governmental 
function exercised for a public purpose of primary 
benefit to the entire community. It is primary for 
a public purpose not only because the relocation 
is made necessary in order to expedite public 
travel and transportation, but also for other sub-
stantial reasons." (Emphasis supplied) 
The Court further stated at page 652: 
"It is argued, however, that since plaintiff util-
ity at common law and under the terms of the 
occupancy permits issued to it by the state, was 
entitled to no reimbursement and was solely re-
sponsible for all costs of relocating its facilities 
on the highway, the reimbursement act, in author-
izing payment of such relocation costs from the 
highway fund, confers upon the plaintiff a gratu-
ity of public monies in violation of Minnesota 
. Constitution, Article IX, Sections 1 and 10. This 
argument ignores the well established principl~ 
followed by other jurisdictions with identical or 
similar constitutional provisions-that, although 
gratuities and benevolences of public monies in 
aid of private undertaking are prohibited, the 
state Constitution does not prohibit the legislature 
from by prospective action (that is by an enact-
ment prior to the ordering of a relocation of utility 
facilities or prior to the commencement of a great 
public work requiring such relocation) , fixing the 
conditions of performance and making provisions 
for the future recognition of claims for damages 
founded on equity and justice, although such 
claims would otherwise be damnum absque injuria 
and unenforceable against the state." 
The Appellant has attempted to discount the sound-
ness of the Minnesota decision by arguing that the Court 
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was influenced solely by the economic consequences of its 
decision. We submit that such is not the case. The Court 
took notice of the economic factors which had been con-
sidered by the legislature and discussed the "realities of 
the situation" but prior to that point in its opinion it had 
answered affirmatively the question of whether reim-
bursement to utilities for relocation of their facilities 
was an expenditure for a public purpose which was of 
benefit to the community and which was related to the 
functions of government. 
On January 6, 1960, the Supreme Court of Texas 
in the State of Texas v. City of Dallas, Southwes~tern Bell 
Telephone Co., Dallas Power and Light Co. and Lone 
Star Gas Co., ________ S.W. 2d ________ (see Appendix) upheld 
the constitutionality of the Texas Relocation Law against 
the attack that it was a lending of the credit of the State 
in violation of Article III, Sections 50 and 51 of the 
Texas Constitution. The Court said: 
"Respondents benefit from the statute only in 
the sense that they are relieved of a financial bur-
den which they could be required to bear. The 
question to be decided then is whether the use of 
public funds to pay part or all of the loss or ex-
pense to which an individual or corporation is sub-
jected by the state in the exercise of its police 
power is an unconstitutional donation for a pri-
vate purpose. We think not provided the statute 
creating the right of reimbursement operates 
prospectively, deals with the matter in which the 
public has a real and legitimate interest, and is 
not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious." 
The Maine, New Hampshire, Minnesota and Texas 
decisions are well-reasoned and logical opinions substan-
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tiated by sound legal precedent and authorities and 
should be followed by this Court. 
There are many authorities which, while dealing 
with somewhat different statutes, hold that a Legisla-
ture can constitutionally relieve a utility of the cost 
of effecting changes in its facilities to accommodate 
public improvements. These decisions support the same 
legal princi pies that sustain the validity of Chapter 53. 
The most recent of these cases is Wilson v. Long 
Branch, 142 A. 2d 837, where the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey upheld the constitutionality of the provision in 
the Blighted Area Act pursuant to which the expense 
of utility relocation necessitated by an urban redevelop-
ment plan was to be paid as a part of the cost of the 
municipal project. The Court said (142 A. 2d at 847): 
"Utilities are necessary adjuncts of the public 
welfare. Their business operations and their 
property have been subject to special legislative 
treatment for many years ..... In the present con-
text, uninterrupted service during and after com-
pletion of the redevelopment project is vital. 
Where removal of the facilities is necessary, it is 
important that the relocation be as expeditious 
and as controversy-free as possible. That end is 
intimately related to the achievement of the over-
all public purpose. . . " 
A leading case is Oswego a.nd S. R. Co. v. State, 
124 N. E. 8 (N.Y. Ct. of App.). In that case, the rail-
road had built its bridge pursuant to a permit issued by 
the · state which required the railroad to remove the 
bridge at its own expense. Subsequently, the river was 
improved for navigation and a statute was passed which 
provided for the state to pay the cost of constructing a 
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new bridge, notwithstanding the agreement which the 
railroad had made and the fact that in New York the 
state could, in the exercise of its police power, improve 
navigation and require uncompensated relocation of the 
bridge. The Court held that, in the Legislature's dis-
cretion, it could assume that burden without contraven-
ing Article 8, Section 9 of the New York Constitution, 
which provided that "neither the credit nor the money 
of the state shall be given or loaned to or in aid of any 
association, corporation, or private undertaking." 
In rendering the opinion of the Court, Justice Car-
dozo made the following statement: 
"The state was about to execute a great public 
work. It saw that in the doing of that work there 
would be destruction of private property. Much 
of the damage would be damnum absque injuria. 
None the less it would be damage. The result 
would be inequality in the distribution of public 
burdens. Some would pay more dearly than others 
in proportion to benefits received. This inequality 
the Legislature, fixing in advance the conditions 
of the undertaking, had the power to correct. It 
might refuse to launch an enterprise at the price 
of hardship and oppression. There was power to 
destroy, and leave the loss where it might fall. 
There was also power to pay for the destruction, 
and thereby re-establish some uniformity of pro-
portion between benefits and burdens. The ques-
tion was for the Legislature whether the equity 
of compensation was strong enough to merit recog-
nition. We cannot hold it to be illusory." 
In discussing the foregoing case on page 9 of its 
Brief, the Appellant has stated that "the New York 
Courts have dealt with this problem as a statutory one 
only and have reached different conclusions depending 
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upon the statute involved." This is not entirely correct. 
In the Oswego case, the Court dealt specifically with a 
constitutional provision almost identical with Article VI, 
Section 31 of the Utah Constitution. In Westchester 
Electric R. R. Co. vs. Westchester County Park Com-
mission, supra, the Court clearly stated that a statute 
imposing the expense of utility relocation upon the public 
body directing such changes "did not conflict with any 
constitutional prohibition." 
In Transit Commission vs. Long Island R. R. Co., 
171 N. E. 565 and New Y_ork Tunnel Authority vs. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 68 N.E. 2d 445, the New York 
Court of Appeals· reaffirmed its previous· rulings that 
the common law rule could be changed by statutory 
enactment, but held that the Legislature had not ex-
pressly provided in the statutory provisions under con-
sideration that the cost of relocation should be borne by 
the state. 
On page 10 of its Brief, Appellant has quoted from 
New Orleans Gaslight Co. vs. Drainage Commission of 
New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, in support of the proposition 
that a utility is required to pay its own relocation costs 
and that the grant of rights in the subsurface are held 
subject to such reasonable regulation as the public health 
and safety may require. We accept the reasoning of the 
New Orleans case and the decision which required the 
utility to relocate at its own expense. However, we wish 
to point out that the utility in the Netv Orleans case was 
not allowed reimbursement for relocating its facilities 
because the common law rule, requiring uncompensated 
relocations, had not been changed by statute. There is 
nothing in the New Orleans case to substantiate Appel-
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lant's position that a statutory enactment changing the 
common law rule would be unconstitutional. 
In City of Beaumont v. Priddie, 65 S.W. 2d 434 
(Tex. Civ. App.), dismissed as 1noot, 95 S.W. 2d 1290, an 
agreement had been made between the city and the rail-
road for sharing expenses in the elimination of grade 
crossings. The Court held that the contract did not vio-
late a constitutional provision similar to Article VI, 
Section 31, and stated: 
"But, although the state may compel the rail-
road to bear the entire expense of grade separa-
tion, nevertheless it is not required to do so, but 
may bear the entire expense itself, or apportion it 
between itself an.d the railroad. While this power 
is generally recognized, the cases in which it has 
been challenged as violative of constitutional pro-
visions similar to those in this state inhibiting the 
state or its subdivisions from making donations 
to private corporations or individuals appear to 
be rare. Those in which the question has been 
considered uniformly held that state or municipal 
contribution to the expense does not come within 
such inhibition. Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Canal 
Board, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 N.E. 964, Ann. Cas. 
1913C, 1228; Brooke v Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123, 
29 A. 387, 24 L.R.A. 781. We think the soundness 
of this holding cannot seriously be questioned. 
While the paramount duty rests upon the railroad 
to provide originally and thereafter to maintain 
the safety of the crossing, regardless of the re-
quirements in that regard brought about by 
changes in conditions, still the interest therein of 
the state as representative of the public is such 
that the expenditure of public funds in this regard 
is a legitimate governmental function, and does 
not properly fall within the designation of a dona-
tion of public funds to a private enterprise. In the 
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infinite variety of situations which present them-
selves, the state may properly make an adjustment 
of the expense, as the peculiar equities of each sit-
uation may in its judgment dictate. In this matter 
the judgment of the state is supreme, subject to 
judicial review only in case of fraudulent or arbi-
trary abuse of power." (Emphasis supplied) 
In Brooke v. City of Philadelphia, 29 Atl. 387 (Pa. 
1894), the city desired to eliminate a grade crossing and 
agreed with the railroad that each would bear one-half 
of the expense. It was contended that this agreement 
violated the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
prohibiting the lending of the credit of municipalities to 
corporations or individuals. The Court rejected this con-
tention, and added the observation that the city could 
even have borne the entire expense if it had seen fit to do 
. 
s_o, saying: 
"As to the second averment of the bill, -that 
the debt to be created, to· the extent of one-half, 
is practically a loan· of the city's credit to the 
Philadelphia & Reading Railroad· Company, a pri-
vate corporation, -we are of the opinion it can-
not be sustained. The avoidance of grade cross-
ing is not only desirable, but, with the gro,vth of 
the city in business and population, may be con-
sidered absolutely necessary. . . · . And the city 
has the power to assume the entire expense of the 
municipal improvement.'' 
In Baltimore Gas and Elect1'ic Co. v. State Roads 
Commission, 134 A. 2d 312 ( Md. 1957), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that under a statute provid-
in·g that all private property damaged or destroyed in 
constructing a tunnel in Baltimore Harbor should be re-
stored or adequate compensation made therefor, the util-
ity com~any ~~s entitled to be reimbursed for the cost 
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of the removal, relocation, and reconstruction of its 
facilities located in, on, or under public highways. The 
Court recognized that the statute "puts an obligation 
on the Commission, as an agency to whom the State 
has delegated the police power necessary for the doing 
of the work authorized, that it would not bear other-
wise." ( p. 315) In rejecting the Commission's attack, 
it said that the statute "does not take from the Commis-
sion the right or the power to decide what project is to 
be built, or how; no more does it shackle its right and 
power to make a public utility move its facilities if they 
are in the path of construction. It merely says that 
policy of the State is to pay for the cost of removal and 
relocation .... " ( p. 317) See also Mayor and City Coun-
cil of Baltimore vs. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company 
________ A. 2d ________ (Dec. 11, 1959). 
Thus, in cases where a similar constitutional ques~ 
tion was raised, the courts have been almost unanimous 
in their rejection of contentions of the character ad-
vanced by Appellant and have held that State expendi-
tures for relocation costs are for a proper public purpose. 
We believe it pertinent to point out that in 1917 
the State of Utah enacted legislation which provided 
that the Public Service Commission of Utah should have 
authority to prescribe the terms and conditions for the 
elimination of railroad grade crossings and "the pro-
portions in which the expense of the alterations or aboli-
tion of such crossings or the separation of such grades 
shall be divided between the railroad or street railroad 
corporations affected, or between such corporations and 
the state, county, municipality or other public authority 
in interest." Chapter 47, Laws of Utah 1917. Section 
54.-4-15, UCA 1953. 
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This statutory provision has been in effect for 43 
years and although it is impossible to tell in how many 
instances cost sharing under this statute has been accom-
plished, it may reasonably be assumed that such have 
been made and that public monies have been used to 
defray the state, county or municipal share thereof. This 
statute has been reviewed by this Court in Denver and 
Rio Grande R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of 
Utah, 51 U. 623, 172 Pac. 4 79; Union Pacific R. Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 103 U. 186, 134 P. 2d 469; 
and Provo City vs. Department of Business Regulation, 
118 U. 1, 218 P. 2d 675, and the authority of the Public 
Service Commission to prescribe the manner and terms 
upon which railroad tracks may be constructed and main-
tained across a public street has been affirmed in each 
case. We respectfully submit that this statutory provi-
sion is the same in principle as the Relocation Law and 
that the use of public funds for railroad grade separa-
tions or utility relocations does not contravene Article 
VI, Section 31 of the Constitution. 
And why is it that there is no difference between 
the railroad grade separation cases and the case before 
the Court? That reason, to us, seems obvious. In the 
railroad cases, the railroad may be compelled at com-
mon law to stand all the cost of changing the grade or its 
bridges where this is necessary to accommodate a su-
perior public need. Erie Railroad Co. v. Board of Public 
Utility Commissioners, 254 U.S. 394; Missouri Pacific 
R. R. Co. v. City of Ornaha, 235 U.S. 121; Chicago, Mil-
waukee and St. Paul R. R. Co. vs. City of Minneapolis, 
232 U.S. 430. As the United States Supreme Court in 
the last cited case said: 
"It is well settled that railroad corporations 
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may be required, at their own expense, not only to 
abolish existing grade crossings, but also to build 
and maintain suitable bridges or viaducts to carry 
highways, newly laid out, over their tracks, or to 
carry their tracks over such highways." 
In the case before the Court and assuming the val-
idity of the common law rule, a utility may also be com-
pelled to adjust or relocate its facilities at its expense 
in response to the necessities of the public. If, then, it is 
valid for a state to relieve all or a part of a burden which 
it may place entirely upon a railroad without violating 
constitutional provisions like Article ·vi, Section 31, then 
certainly a legislative effort to relieve non-railroad utili-
ties from a like or similar burden is also valid. 
We also direct the Court's attention to Section 
10-7-19, UCA 1953, wherein cities and towns are per-
mitted to "aid and encourage the building of railroads" 
by grants of real property owned by the City. This 
statute was adopted in 1901, has been reviewed by the 
Supreme Court in Knight v. Thomas, 35 U. 470, 101 Pac. 
383; and its constitutionality never questioned· even 
though the prohibitions of Article VI, Section 31 apply 
to cities and towns as well as to the state. 
Appellant in arguing that Chapter 53 contravenes 
Article VI, Section 31, relies solely on decisions by the 
Supreme Courts of New Mexico, Tennessee and Idaho. 
We respectfully submit that these decisions are contrary 
to the weight of authority and that the cases heretofore 
cited should be followed by this Honorable Court. 
In State of Tennessee ex rel. Leach v. Southern Bell 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 319 S.W. 2d 90 ( 1958), a closely divided 
court held that the Tennessee Relocation Law was uncon-
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stitutional in that it was a lending of the credit of the 
state. 
The basic premise of the majority opinion was that 
a utility's right on the highway was a mere gratuitous 
privilege and that therefore there is no equity in reim-
bursing it for relocation expenses. It is apparent that 
the Tennessee Court had been led into a misconception 
of the utility's right, which is directly contrary to_ the 
generally accepted rule of law, including the law of Ten-
nessee. Chattanooga v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 
112 s.w. 2d 385. * 
However, even assuming that the Tennessee Court's 
characterization of a utility's right of occupancy is cor-
rect, its decision should not be followed because its sole 
basis is not relevant to the constitutional issue here 
involved. The lawmaking power of the Legislature is 
obviously not dependent on the technical nature of the 
utilities' right. Even if they had a mere privilege the 
Legislature could provide for reimbursement of reloca-
tion expenses on Federal-Aid highways. 
This misconception of the issues by the Tennessee 
Court necessarily led to further errors. Thus, in failing 
to recognize that the property rights of the utilities 
could be burdened or curtailed only in the proper exer-
cise of the police power and therefore the issue before 
it was the reasonableness of the exercise of the police 
'* It should be noted that the franchises granted by the cities or counties 
to the Respondents herein vest in the franchise holder a property right which 
is protected by both the State and Federal Constitution. Owensboro v. Cum· 
berland Tel. r/:r Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58; Boise Artesian H. r/:r C. Water Co. v. 
Boise City, 230 U.S. 67; Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195; Louisville v. Cum· 
berland Tel. r/:r Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649; Knoxville v. Africa, 77 Fed. 501, 507; 
City of Lansing v. JUichigan Power Co., 150 N."'· 250; City of Summerville v. 
Georgia Power Co., 55 S.E. 2d 540. 
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power by the Legislature in prescribing rules of law 
for the future, the Court necessarily failed to give effect 
to the presumption of the constitutionality of legislative 
action. An examination of the majority opinion clearly 
shows that the court substituted its judgment as to the 
wisdom of the legislation for that of the Legislature. 
The majority opinion makes a brief reference to the 
case of Oswego & S. R. Co., et al. v. State, supra, in which 
it does not take issue with Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion, 
but attempts to distinguish it by the statement that: 
"The whole basis of Justice Cardozo's' opinion 
is that the legislature may enact acts when equity 
demands. The facts in the Oswego case showed 
that equity did demand that the state step in and 
do equity. We have no question of equity in the 
present case. The user of the defendants was only 
permissive.'" 
This is not a valid distinction. The railroad in the 
Oswego case constructed its bridge over a navigable 
stream under an express agreement that it would recon-
struct it at its own expense. Certainly the use made by 
the railroad of a location within the confines of a navi-
gable stream was no less permissive than is the use of the 
utilities in Tennessee. In Minneapolis Ga8 Co. v. Zim-
merman, supra, the Court held that it was equitable and 
just to pay a gas company for relocating its lines which 
had been originally constructed under a permit issued 
by the Commissioner of Highways in which the company 
agreed to bear that expense, and expressly relied on the 
Oswego case. There were no facts to be found in the 
Oswego case (or the Minnesota case) giving rise to any 
"equity" not equally present in the Tennessee case or in 
the case at bar. 
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Finally, the majority of the Tennessee Court failed 
to even mention the numerous authorities directly in 
point. Instead, it relied exclusively on a Kentucky case, 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W. 
2d 308, and a Georgia case, Mulkey v. Quillian, 100 S.E. 
2d 268. Neither case supports the decision of the Ten-
nessee Court. 
In the Kentucky case, there was no statute, such as 
Chapter 53, expressly directing reimbursement for utility 
relocation, but the utility nevertheless claimed reimburse-
ment even in absence of such a statute. In denying re-
imbursement, the Court found that the company's fran-
chise imposed on it the duty to relocate at its own expense. 
Having thus held that the company was required 
to relocate without compensation under the provisions 
of its franchise (there being no contrary statute) the 
opinion then contains the following which is obiter 
dictum: 
". . . If construed as requiring removal and re-
location at the expense of the state, the franchise 
was in violation of Article II, Section 33, of our 
Third Constitution, which was carried over into 
Section 177 of our present Constitution, and pro-
vided: 
'The credit of this Commonwealth shall not 
be given or loaned in aid of any person, associa-
tion, municipality, or corporation.' " 
That this statement was not necessary to the de-
cision was recognized by the Court itself as shown by th~ 
underscored words. The Court had already held that the 
franchise could not be "construed as requiring removal 
and relocation at the expense of the state." Therefore, 
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what might be its opinion if it had construed the fran-
chise otherwise could be nothing but dictum. 
Furthermore, the Kentucky Court was not. passing 
upon the constitutionality of a statute (such as Chapter 
53) which changed the existing Kentucky common law 
and declared a changed future public policy applicable 
to all utilities. On the contrary, there was involved in the 
Kentucky case a special act granting a franchise to a 
single utility. 
If the Kentucky dictum were to be applied to a gen-
eral statute like Chapter 53 which lays down a changed 
public policy for the future, then it would be irreconcil-
able with and directly opposed to the many adjudications 
directly on the point which have been heretofore cited 
and neither could it be supported in the light of previous 
Kentucky decisions. Guthrie v. Curlin, 263 S.W. 2d 240 
(Ky.). 
In Kentucky, as in Utah, the grade crossing elimina-
tion acts provide for reimbursing the railroads out of 
tax funds which is the same thing in principle as Chap-
ter 53. In Union Light, Heat and Power Company v. 
Railroad, 79 S.W. 2d 199 (Ky.), the Court held that 
there is no compulsion on the state to make compensation 
to railroad companies for relocating their facilities when 
necessitated by grade crossing eliminations, but indicated 
that an express direction by the Legislature to that effect 
would be unobjectionable. The Court there stated: 
" ... The reasonable construction of the Elimi-
nation Act under these circumstances is to assume 
that the people are not to be burdened with any 
heavier expe.nse than necessity requires, and that 
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to relieve the public service corporations having 
franchises in the streets of their common-law lia-
bilities and to pass them over to the taxpayer can 
only be accomplished by the express direction of 
the Legislature. 
* * * * * * * * 
". . . We think, as did the Court of Appeals of 
New York in Transit Commission v. Long Island 
Railroad Co., supra, that an express direction of 
the Legislature would be required before appel-
lant could recover the expenses here involved." 
( pp. 201-202) (Emphasis added) 
The dictum contained in Southern Bell v. Common-
wealth, supra, is entitled to little consideration since 
the constitutional issue was neither raised nor briefed 
and since there was no statute in that case which bears 
any resemblance to the statute here in issue. 
The Georgia case of Mulkey v. Quillian, supra, dealt 
with an entirely different type of statute and has no 
application to the case at bar. Chapter 53 shifts the bur-
den of paying relocation expenses from the utilities to the 
state. The Georgia statute expressly presupposed that 
the cost of relocation was chargeable to the utility and 
provided that the Highway Department may make loans 
to municipally-owned utilities for all or part of the cost 
of relocation, such loans to be repaid over a period not to 
exceed fifteen years. The Georgia Court held the statute 
to be unconstitutional on the sole ground that its Con-
stitution does not permit "the using of public funds for 
the purpose of engaging in the money lending business." 
Thus, none of the questions here involved were before 
the Georgia court, and the Tennessee Court was incorrect 
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in stating that the Mulkey case is authority for holding 
invalid the Tennessee statute. 
The New Mexico case of State Highway Commission 
v. Southern Union Gas Co., 332 P. 2d 1007, was in no 
small measure based on the foregoing Tennessee decision. 
Indeed, the opinion in the New Mexico case makes it 
even plainer that the court misconceived the basic issue. 
As its only New Mexico authorities, it relied on two 
cases, Hutcheson v. Atherton, 99 P. 2d 462, and Harring-
ton v. Atteberry, 153 Pac. 1041. These cases involved 
appropriations by the Legislature, without any substan-
tive legislation, to private corporations engaged, respec-
tively, in the holding of county fairs and of a celebration 
to commemorate the initial exploration of New Mexico. 
In neither case had the Legislature exercised the police 
power of the state in prescribing general rules of law 
for the future. 
Moreover, the New Mexico decision is clearly not 
applicable in Utah. It appears from the opinion that 
in New Mexico, a public purpose is not enough to sup-
port an expenditure of public funds, but that such funds 
can be paid only to subordinate governmental agencies 
or persons under the control of the state. This rule does 
not seem to pertain in any other jurisdiction, and it cer-
tainly is not the law in Utah. In Bailey v. Van Dyke, 
66 U. 184, 240 Pac. 454, 457, this Court discussed Har-
rington v. Atteberry, supra, and pointed out that the 
New Mexico constitutional provision prohibits grants 
to any person or corporation "not under the absolute con-
trol of the state." The Utah Court stated: "There is no 
such provision in the Utah Constitution." 
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The recent decision in State of Idaho vs.ldaho Power 
Company, et al., 346 P. 2d 596, is, we submit, based 
on a misunderstanding of the purpose and effect of the 
Idaho Relocation Law. 
The Idaho Court, evidenced by the quotation on 
page 20 of Appellant's Brief, viewed the Relocation Law 
as giving the utilities a property right on the public 
streets and highways and determined that the granting 
of such a property right would result in a dimunition 
of the quantum of ownership of the public in its public 
thoroughfares. 
This analysis of the statute is incorrect in that the 
Court misconstrued the effect of the Relocation Law. 
The Relocation Law of Idaho, as well as Utah, does 
not give or attempt to give the utilities a property right 
of any kind or character and certainly succeeding legis-
latures could repeal or amend the law without depriving 
the utilities of any property right. 
As we have heretofore pointed out, the Relocation 
Law is an exercise of the police power by the state. What 
type of legal right the utility has once it has placed its 
facilities on the public thoroughfare is not changed or 
altered by the Relocation Law, and whether such right 
is a property right and called an easement, license, in-
corporeal hereditament or corporeal hereditament or a 
permissive right is not pertinent to the question here 
at issue. 
We are at a loss to understand how the Idaho Court 
permitted itself to become enmeshed in the question of 
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property rights when called upon to construe a statute 
which authorized the state to make payments for reloca-
tion of utility facilities that had been put in place pursu-
ant to statutory authorization. 
The Idaho Court also was mistaken in determining 
what the legal rights of the utilities were after placing 
their facilities on the highways pursuant to statute or 
franchise. Although it is not pertinent to the issues here 
before the Court, we wish to point out again that a utility, 
once it has placed its facilities on the highways, has a 
property right protected by both the federal and state 
constitutions (see footnote, page 40) , even though the 
state, in the exercise of its police power, can require the 
utility to relocate its facilities without liability for the 
cost of relocation, and with liability for the cost of re-
location when the legislature has so provided. 
In attempting to distinguish the decision of Minne-
apolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra, the Idaho Court 
held that inasmuch as the utilities acquired no property 
right upon placing their facilities in the public thorough-
fares that the state could not pay for their relocation 
because there was no taking, only damages, and there-
fore the injury would be damnum absque injuria. Here 
again the Court was incorrect in that it is clear that in 
Idaho the legislature has the right to provide, as it did 
in the Relocation Law, for the payment of damages to 
property even though there be no taking, but only dam-
ages resulting from the construction of Federal-Aid 
highways. Idaho-Western Ry. Co. vs. Columbian Confer-
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If the issue of whether or not the constitution pro-
vides for damages as well as taking of property is perti-
nent, then there is no question but that in Utah the Legis-
lature has the authority to enact Chapter 53 and provide 
for the payment of damages. Article I, Section 22, Utah 
Constitution and Section 78-34-10, UCA, 1953. There-
fore, we respectfully submit that the Court should not 
adopt the rationale and decision of the Idaho Court. 
We now turn to some of the Utah cases construing 
Article VI, Section 31. This section of the Constitution 
was construed in Bailey vs. Va.n Dyke, supra, as not pro-
hibiting a county from appropriating money for agri-
cultural extension work in the face of allegations that 
the funds appropriated enured to the benefit of the Farm 
Bureau, a private association. 
In Lehi City vs. Meiling, 87 U. 234, 48 P. 2d 530, 
551, Mr. Justice Wolfe in referring to Article VI, Sec-
tion 31, said: 
"In other words, this section is directed against 
the practice which "\vas prevelant at the time our 
Constitution was drafted amongst states and 
municipalities, to-wit, that of aiding private ven-
tures, instituted for private profit but which it 
was thought would indirectly benefit and develop 
the particular local division loaning its credit." 
In Wallberg v. Utah Public Welfare Commission, 
115 U. 242, 203 P. 2d 935, the Utah Public Assistance 
Act was held not to violate Article VI, Section 31. The 
act provided that the Welfare Commission might "loan" 
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money to needy aged persons upon pledge of their real 
property as security. The Court upheld the Act stating: 
"Respondents advance the argument that this 
act is a loan of credit forbidden by Article VI, 
Section 31, of the Utah Constitution. With this 
we cannot agree. See: State ex rei. Nielson et al. 
v. Lindstrom, Idaho 1948, 191 P. 2d 1009; City 
and County of San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Cat 
187, 13 P. 2d 912; Bowman v. Frost 1942, 289 Ky. 
826, 158 S.W. 2d 945. The object to be realized 
by the act is aid to needy persons over the age of 
65 years, and the lien provision provides a means 
to equalize that aid in the best possible manner. 
If money can be given to the aged in the interest of 
public welfare, it is hard to see how doing less 
than that-loaning it to them, is bad. The pur-
pose of the act is to uphold the State's moral obli-
gation to look after its needy. This is its public 
purpose. The following quotation from 21 R.C.L. 
701, quoted with approval in Bowman v. Frost, 
supra, is illustrative of this moral obligation and 
public duty: 
"'The care of the state for its dependent classes 
is considered by all enlightened people as a meas-
ure of its civilization, and the care of the poor is 
generally recognized as among the unquestioned 
object of public duty, but in spite of this, the duty 
under the common law was purely moral and not 
legal. There is therefore no legal obligation at 
common law on any of the instrumentalities of 
government to furnish relief to paupers. The obli-
gation to support such persons results only from 
statute . ... ' " (Emphasis supplied) 
Similarly, the obligation of the State to assume util-
ity relocation costs results only from statute. If the State 
may by statute assume financial burdens which at com-
mon law it was not obliged to assume, then certainly it 
may recognize and alleviate burdens cast upon utilities 
by the common ·law. 
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In Barlow v. Clearfield City Corporation, 1 U. 2d 
419, 268 P. 2d 682, this Court upheld a contract between 
a municipality and a water conservancy district where 
the city was obligated to take, or failing to take, never-
theless pay for certain quantities of water. The Court 
held the contract was not a loan of the city's credit to the 
district. 
If the State or its agencies and instrumentalities 
can give or loan money to indigents and contract its 
credit for water, it does so because it is for public pur-
pose. Such a function embraces expenditures made for 
those activities of government in which the State has a 
legitimate interest. 
The cases from other jurisdictions holding that 
reimbursement of relocation expenses is a proper govern-
mental expenditure present the most persuasive author-
ity that the standards set out in the Utah case are met. 
It appears well settled in Utah that if the Legisla-
ture adopts legislation in furtherance of a public pur-
pose and exercises a governmental function tending to 
promote the public welfare, then such legislation is not 
in conflict with Article VI, Section 31. Thomas v. Daugh-
ters of Utah Pioneers, 114 U. 108, 197 P. 2d 477. The 
legislature, in adopting Chapter 53, exercised its inher-
ent and constitutional powers to determine how the 
burdens imposed by the expanding highway program 
should be distributed. When the state, through its State 
Road Commission engages in the construction, mainte-
nance and repair of highways it exercises a public gov-
ernmental function and the legislature has now deter-
mined that utility relocation expense is a proper expen-
diture in connection with this activity of the state. 
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IV. 
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUB-
LICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVELY 
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAIN-
AGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND 
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS FOR RELOCATION OF FA-
CILITIES AS AUTHORZED BY CHAPTER 
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, DOES NOT RE-
LEASE OR EXTINGUISH AN INDEBTED-
NESS, LIABILITY OR OBLIGATION IN VIO-
LATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 27 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
The Appellant has alleged in its Brief that Chapter 
53 is repugnant to Article VI, Section 27, of the Utah 
Constitution which provides that: 
"The Legislature shall have no power to release 
or extinguish, in whole or in part, the indebted-
ness, liability or obligation of any corporation or 
person to the state, or to any municipal corpora-
tion therein." 
However, Appellant has failed to cite any legal 
authority or decision of any Court which would substan-
tiate its position. Therefore, we submit that inasmuch 
as "every presumption must be indulged in favor of the 
constitutionality of an act, and every reasonable doubt 
resolved in favor of its validity" that the Appellant has 
failed to sustain the burden which "lies on him who denies 
the constitutionality of a legislative enactment" Thomas 
v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, supra. 
Even though Appellant has failed to discuss this 
provision of the Constitution, we nevertheless shall 
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affirmatively show that Chapter 53 does not violate 
Article VI, Section 27. 
Any argument based on the aforementioned pro-
vision of the Constitution must, we assume, rest on the 
proposition that when the utility facilities of the Respond-
ents were placed on the streets and roads, an obligation 
to remove arose which became fixed and certain and 
thereafter the Legislature had no authority to change the 
law for the future. 
Implicit in the argument is the proposition that 
whatever duty rested upon the utility to relocate at its 
own expense under the common law was such a respon-
sibility or duty which constituted an obligation, indebted-
ness or liability within the meaning of Article VI, Section 
27. 
Examination of this duty or responsibility and its 
comparison with obligations and liabilities which have, 
by decision, been held as within and without the consti-
tutional ban under this type of provision proves the as-
sumption false and unwarranted. First, the duty to 
relocate at the utility's expense under the common law 
was a contingent one. The duty and responsibility arose 
when and if the existing utility facilities interferred 
with the rearrangement of a highway and, further, when 
and if notice was given by the State to the utility to move. 
Second, it cannot be reasonably or logically con-
tended that the duty under the common law created any 
fixed or certain money obligation to the State. Viewing 
the duty or responsibility most rigidly it is, at best, a 
contingent duty not consisting, nor with the possibility 
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of ever consisting, of a definite fixed money obligation 
of which the State could ever become the beneficiary. 
This constitutional provision has no application 
whatever to liabilities, indebtedness or obligations which 
are in any way contingent, inchoate or not due and owing 
until some future time. 
A principle which seems to permeate all decisions 
construing constitutional provisions identical or similar 
to Article VI, Section 27, is that such constitutional pro-
visions apply only to fixed and liquidated claims owing 
the State or municipal corporations. Indeed, constitu-
tional provisions of this character are applicable only to 
taxes and other monetary obligations owed to the State. 
State v. Montoya, 255 Pac. 634 ( N .M.) ; State ex rel. 
Tharel v. Board of Commissioners of Creek County, 
107 P. 2d 542 (Okla.). 
An examination of the various cases decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court relating to Article VI, Section 27, 
fails to disclose any case in point. The only type of cases 
that have been before the Utah Supreme Court have in-
volved contractual or tax liabilities where the obligation, 
if any, was susceptible of being discharged by the pay-
ment of money. City of St. George v. Public Utility Com-
mission, 62 U. 453, 220 Pac. 720; Chez v. Indus1trial Com-
mission of Utah, 90 U. 447, 62 P. 2d 549; In re Ingra-
ham's Estate. Petersen v. State Tax Commission, 106 U. 
337, 148 P. 2d 340; Odgen City v. Public Service Com-
mission, 123 U. 427, 260 P. 2d 751. 
In the very recent case of State of Texas v. City of 
Dallas, et al., supra, the Court held that the Relocation 
Law was not "a release of the obligations of corporations 
and individuals" and said: 
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"Although petitioner argues otherwise, it can-
not be said that respondents are under an abso-
lute and continuing legal obligation to relocate 
at their own expense any utility installments 
owned by them and situated in public ways when-
ever such relocation is made necessary by high-
way improvements. Their use of streets and high-
ways for this purpose is simply subject at all 
times to a valid exercise of the police power of the 
state. It is only when the full measure of that 
power is exerted that they are obligated to make 
the installations conform to highway improve-
ments at their own expense. This duty would 
arise upon, and not before, the making of a law-
ful demand for relocation of the facilities. Here 
the Legislature has empowered the State High-
way Commission to construct interstate and de-
fense highways and to direct municipalities and 
utility companies to relocate their facilities. 
That grant of authority is conditioned, however, 
by the requirement that the utilities be reim-
bursed for the expense which they incur. In our 
opinion this does not constitute the release of an 
obligation to the state within the meaning of 
Article III, Section 55 of the Constitution." 
The Montana Constitution, Article V, Section 39, is 
substantially the same as Article VI, Section 27, of the 
Utah Constitution. In determining whether the Mon-
tana Relocation Law was in contravention of the Mon-
tana Constitution, the District Judge in the case of V. L. 
(Pat) Jones v. Harry L. Burns, et al. said: 
"Also this opinion has heretofore held that even 
though the liabilities or obligations for relocation 
were assumed by the utilities under their permit 
from the Highway Commission, the Legislature 
was within its constitutional authority to amend 
this agreement to provide for these payments of 
relocation costs. 
"Therefore, this Court holds that Article V, 
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Section 39 of the Montana Constitution has no 
application to Chapter 254, and that the passage 
of said law was not in violation of said constitu-
tional provision." 
For other cases construing similar constitutional 
provisions, which decisions support our position herein, 
see Louisville Home Telephone Company v. City of Lotds-
ville, 113 S.W. 855; Cole v. Burton, 232 S.W. 2d 838; 
Roberts v. The Fiscal Court, 51 S.W. 2d 897; State v. 
Sparks, 253 P. 2d 1070. 
A most persuasive precedent is State v. Chariton 
Drainage District No. 1, 158 S.W. 633 (Mo.). This case 
concerned a Missouri Act under which drainage com-
panies were empowered to cut their ditches through high-
way rights of way and a duty was placed upon the coun-
ties to build and construct bridges over such ditches at 
the expense of the counties. Prior to the adoption of the 
statute, the drainage companies had to bear the expense. 
An attack was made on the statute upon the ground 
that it released or remitted a liability in contravention 
of Article IV, Section 51 of the Missouri Constitution, 
which is similar to Article VI, Section 27. This attack 
was based on the fact that the drainage company, absent 
the legislation placing the burden of the expense of build-
ing bridges over the company's ditches on the counties, 
was under an obligation or liability to build the bridges 
at its own expense and that this burden having been 
shifted to the county was a release or remittance pro-
hibited by the Constitution. In disposing of this conten-
tion and sustaining the constitutionality of the statute, 
the Court said : 
"The second contention is: That such construe-
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tion by this court would violate section 51 of 
article 4 of the Constitution, which prohibits the 
Legislature from releasing, extinguishing, or 
authorizing the releasing or extinguishing, in 
whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability, or 
obligation of any corporation or individual in this 
state, etc. 
"Counsel have clearly misconceived the mean-
ing and purpose of this constitutional provision. 
It is self-evident that before that provision can 
have any application or can be called into opera-
tion, it must first be established that said corpo-
ration or individual is liable or indebted to some 
one, and that the act of the Legislature undertakes 
to release that liability or indebtedness; but in 
the case at bar no liability or indebtedness exists 
on the part of the defendant corporation to Macon 
county, nor does article 1 of chapter 41, R. S. 
1909, undertake or attempt to release any such 
obligation." ( 158 S.W. at 639) 
The Chariton case clearly holds that the shifting of 
this burden to the county by the statute was not a remit-
tance or a release of liability within the meaning of the 
constitutional provision. This case presents the strongest 
parallel possible to the case before this Court, in connec-
tion with a constitutional provision touching the release 
of obligations and liabilities ·and we submit that it is 
decisive on the issue raised herein by Appellant. 
We respectfully submit that Chapter 53, Laws of 
Utah 1957, does not violate Article VI, Section 27, and 
that the Legislature could- constitutionally change the 
burden of utility relocation in connection with relocations 
occurring after the passage of said Act. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the lower court, holding and finding that Chapter 53, 
Laws of Utah 1957 is constitutional, be affirmed and that 
the Appellant is obligated thereby to reimburse Respond-
ents for their relocation expenses. 
LUIS D. ROVIRA 
Respectfully submitted, 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT o~F TEXAS 
NO. A-7173 
The State of Texas, 
v. 
Petitioner, 
City of Austin, et al, 
Respondents. 
NO. A-7174 
The State of Texas, 
v. 
Petitioner, 
City of Dallas, et al, 
Respondents .. 
From Travis County 
Third District 
These declaratory judgment actions place in issue 
the constitutionality of Article 6674w-4, Vernon's Ann. 
Tex. Civ. Stat., which was enacted by the Legislature 
in 1957 as part of House Bill 179. Acts 1957, 55th Leg., 
p. 724, ch. 300, § 4A. The statute provides that the re-
location of utility facilities necessitated by the improve-
ment of highways established as part of the National 
System of Interstate and Defense Highways shall be 
made by the utility at the cost and expense of the state 
provided such relocation is eligible for Federal partici-
pation. It evidently was adopted for the purpose of 
securing the benefits of the Federal-Aid Highway Act 
of 1956, which authorizes the use of Federal funds to 
reimburse the state for the cost of relocating utility 
facilities in the same proportion as such funds are ex-
pended on a given project, with the proviso that Federal 
money shall not be used for that purpose when payment 
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to the utility violates either state law or a legal con-
tract between the utility and the state. See 23 U.S. C. A. 
§ 123. 
The two suits, which have been consolidated for sub-
mission on appeal, were instituted by the Attorney Gen-
eral in the name of the State of Texas, petitioner, one 
against the City of Dallas, Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Company, Dallas Power & Light Company, and Lone 
Star Gas Company, respondents, and the other against the 
City of Austin, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 
and Southern Union Gas Company, respondents. These 
municipalities and companies have various utility facili-
ties located within the rights of way of city streets, 
alleys and other public places in the corporate limits of 
Austin and Dallas, and it will be necessary to relocate 
the same in connection with the improvement and con-
struction of designated interstate high,vays. Respondents 
have taken the position that they are entitled to be reim-
bursed for the cost of doing this as provided in Article 
6674w-4, while petitioner insists that the statute is un-
constitutional. The law was upheld by the trial court, 
and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 319 S. W. 2d 
767. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil 
Appeals. 
Petitioner's first four points of error in this Court 
assert that Article 6674w-4, to the extent that it author-
izes the use of public funds to pay part of the cost of re-
locating utility facilities now situated .in public ways 
and owned either by a municipality in its proprietary 
capacity or by a utility company, contravenes the Texas 
Constitution in that such payment would constitute: (1) 
a grant of public moneys to corporations and individuals 
ii 
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in violation of Article III, Section 51; ( 2) a gift or loan 
of the credit of the state in violation of Article III, Section 
50; ( 3) a release of the obligations of corporations and 
individuals in violation of Article III, Section 55; and 
(4) an appropriation for private or individual pur-
poses in violation of Article XVI, Section 6. These four 
points are closely related and have been grouped by 
petitioner for purposes of argument. 
In the absence of assumption by the state of part 
of the expense, it is clear that respondents could be re-
quired to remove at their own expense any installations 
owned by them and located in public rights of way when-
ever such relocation is made necessary by highway im-
provements. See City of San Antonio v. Bexar Metro-
politan Water District, Tex. Civ. App., 309 S. W. 2d 491 
(wr. ref.) ; City of San Antonio v. San Antonio St. Ry. 
Co., Tex. Civ. App., 39 S. W. 136 ( wr. ref.) ; State of 
Tennessee v. United Stat-es, 6th Cir., 256 F. 2d 244. As 
pointed out in the Bexar Metropolitan Water District 
case, the main purposes of roads and streets are for 
travel and transportation. While public utilities may 
use the same for laying their lines, such use is subject to 
reasonable regulation by either the state, the county or 
the city, as the case may be. The utility may always 
be required, in the valid exercise of the police power by 
proper governmental authority, to remove or adjust its 
installations to meet the needs of the public for travel 
and transportation. 
There is no material difference in this respect be-
tween a utility company and a municipal corporation. 
For many years the cities and towns of Texas have en-
joyed exclusive dominion and control over the streets, 
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alleys and other public places within their respective 
corporate limits, but this was pursuant to a statutory 
delegation of authority. See Articles 1016, 1146 and 
1175, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat. The Legislature 
acting for the state has primary and plenary power to 
control and regulate public roads and streets. It may 
delegate that power to counties or municipal corpora-
tions, but such a grant of authority may be revoked or 
modified at any time. See Robbins v. Limestone County, 
114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915; West v. City of Waco, 116 
Tex. 472, 294 S.W. 832; 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§§ 1686, 1689. The statutory power of cities and towns 
over public ways within their corporate limits has now 
been abridged by Sections 2 and 5 of House Bill 179. See 
Articles 6674w-l and 6674w-5, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. 
Stat. It is there provided that the State Highway Com-
mission shall have the power to construct, maintain and 
operate designated state highways in any area of the 
state, whether in or outside the limits of any municipal 
corporation, and that the exercise of such power shall 
qualify and render inconclusive the dominion of any city 
or town with respect to the specific streets, alleys or 
other public ways affected thereby. 
The Legislature, if it had decided to do so, could 
also have provided that any utility facilities standing in 
the way must be moved at the owner's cost. Respondents 
recognize that such a requirement would be valid and 
enforceable. Many city ordinances as well as several of 
our statutes authorizing utility companies and municipal 
corporations to erect their lines along and upon public 
roads and streets stipulate that the owner of the facility 
may be required to relocate the same at its own expense 
so as. to permit road and street improvements. See 
iv 
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Articles 1433, 1433a, 1436a, and 1436b, Vernon's Ann. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. These statutes and ordinances express 
the public policy of the state as it existed at the time of 
their adoption. Subject to constitutional limitations, 
however, that policy may be changed by the Legislature 
at any time. See McCain v. Yost, 155 Tex. 174,284 S.W. 
2d 898; Scarborough v. Payne, Tex. Civ. App., 198 S.W. 
2d 917 ( wr. ref. ) . 
After the occurrence of events which under the law 
then existing give rise to an obligation on the part of an 
individual or corporation to the state, the Legislature has 
no power to release or diminish that obligation without 
consideration. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex. 
138, 47 S.W. 2d 265. See also Delta County v. Blackburn, 
100 Tex. 51, 93 S.W. 419. Moreover, the us.e of public 
money to pay a claim predicated on facts which generate 
no state liability constitutes a gift or donation in viola-
tion of our Constitution. See Tompkins v. Williams, Com. 
App., 62 S.W. 2d 70. Respondents could not, therefore, 
be reimbursed for all or any part of the expense incurred 
by them in relocating their lines prior to the adoption 
of House Bill 179. But the statute does not operate re-
trospectively, and respondents claim no right to reim-
bursement for costs incurred before it became effective. 
Although petitioner argues otherwise, it cannot be 
said that respondents are under an absolute and continu-
ing legal obligation to relocate at their own expense any 
utility installments owned by them and situated in public 
ways whenever such relocation is made necessary by 
highway improvements. Their use of streets and high-
ways for this purpose is simply subject at all times to a 
valid exercise of the police power of the state. It is only 
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when the full measure of that power is exerted that they 
are obligated to make the installations conform to high-
way improvements at their own expense. This duty would 
arise upon, and not before, the making of a lawful de-
mand for relocation of the facilities. Here the Legisla-
ture has empowered the State Highway Commission to 
construct interstate and defense highways and to direct 
municipalities and utility companies to relocate their 
facilities. That grant of authority is conditioned, how-
ever, by the requirement that the utilities be reimbursed 
for the expense which they incur. In our opinion this 
does not constitute the release of an obligation to the state 
within the meaning of Article III, Section 55 of the Con-
stitution. See State v. Chariton Drainage District No. 1, 
252 Mo. 345, 158 S.W. 633. 
Article 6674w-4 obviously does not involve a gift 
or loan of the credit of the state unless it can be said that 
payment of relocation costs amounts to a grant of public 
money in violation of Article III, Section 51. The pur-
pose of this section and of Article XVI, Section 6, of the 
Constitution is to prevent the application of public funds 
to private purposes; in other words, to prevent the gratui-
tous grant of such funds to any individual or corpo-
ration whatsoever. See Byrd v. City of Dallas, 118 Tex. 
28, 6 S.W. 2d 738. Statutes analogous to House Bill179 
have been upheld against this or similar constitutional 
attacks by the appellate courts of at least five other juris-
dictions. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, ______ Minn. 
______ , 91 N.W. 2d 642; Opinion of the Justices, ______ N.H. 
______ , 132 A. 2d 613; Opinion of the Justices, ______ Me. ______ , 
132 A. 2d 440; Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission, 185 Pa. Super. 1, 136 A. 2d 
4 73 (reversed on other grounds, 394 Pa. 31, 145 A. 2d 
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538); Oswego & S.R. Co. v. State, 226 N.Y. 351, 124 
N.E. 8. See also Delaware River Port Authority v. 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 393 Pa. 639, 
145 A. 2d 172. On the other hand, the Tennessee statute 
was struck down by a closely divided court on the ground 
that the expenditure authorized thereby is not for a 
public purpose, State v. Southern Bell Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., ______ Tenn. ______ , 319 S.W. 2d 90, and the 
same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico. State Highway Commission v. Southern 
Union Gas Co., 65 N.M. 84, 332 P. 2d 1007. See also 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, _____ _ 
Ky. ______ , 266 S.W. 2d 308; Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 
507, 100 S.E. 2d 268. 
In considering this question, it should be noted that 
no net gain accrues to the utility from the relocation of 
its facilities in the manner and under the conditions pre-
scribed by the statute. "Cost of relocation" is defined 
as including the entire amount paid by the utility prop-
erly attributable to such relocation after deducting any 
increase in value of the new facility and any salvage 
value derived from the old facility. As pointed out by 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the reimbursement 
merely restores the utilities to the position in which they 
were prior to the relocation of their facilities. Minne-
apolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra. It also is clear 
that if not reimbursed for their non-betterment costs, 
respondents will be subjected to substantial expense as 
a direct result of the highway improvement program. 
Respondents benefit from the statute only in the 
sense that they are relieved of a financial burden which 
they could be required to bear. The question to be de-
vii 
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cided then is whether the use of public funds to pay part 
or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or 
corporation is subjected by the state in the exercise of 
its police power is an unconstitutional donation for a 
private purpose. We think not provided the statute 
creating the right of reimbursement operates prospec-
tively, deals with the matter in which the public has a 
real and legitimate interest, and is not fraudulent, arbi-
trary or capricious. 
This question has not arisen frequently, because it 
is rather unusual for a legislative body to ameliorate an 
exercise of the police power. In most cases the courts 
are concerned only with whether the lawmakers have 
gone beyond the extreme limits of such power. When 
that is the issue, the judgment of the Legislature is su-
preme provided there is any reasonable basis for the 
action taken. It has often been said that the lawmakers 
have considerable discretion in determining not only 
what the interests of the public require but also what 
measures are necessary for the protection of those inter-
ests. If there is room for a fair difference of opinion 
as to the necessity for and reasonableness of an enact-
ment which lies within the domain of the police power, 
the courts will not hold it void. See City of Bellaire v. 
Lamkin, ______ Tex. ______ , 317 S.W. 2d 43. 
Compensation is not required to be made for damage 
or loss resulting from a valid exercise of the police power. 
See State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301 S.W. 2d 597, and 
authorities there cited. The absence of a cause of action 
does not, however, reduce the loss which individuals are 
often required to bear or make their injuries any less 
real. When the benefits to be gained by the public are 
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not commensurate with the burdens imposed upon private 
persons, the law will not be permitted to stand. See 
Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. City of Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 
84 S.W. 648, 70 L.R.A. 850; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. 
Co. v. Rockwall County L. I. Dist. No. 3, 117 Tex. 34, 
297 S.W. 206. Individual hardship is thus to be weighed 
by the courts against the public advantages of a measure 
in determining whether the statute is a valid exercise 
of the police power. These factors are also to be con-
sidered by the Legislature in making its determination 
as to the manner in which such power may and should 
be exercised. It would be quite strange then to say that 
the lawmakers have no choice except to act not at all 
when they conclude that a particular measure is essen-
tial to the public welfare but will be unduly burden-
some to private citizens. If they decide to reimburse the 
latter for part or all of their actual loss or expense, the 
payment is not transformed into a mere gratuity simply 
because it may appear to the courts that the Legislature 
has not exerted the full measure of its power. Our funda-
mental law does not contemplate or require that every 
private injury and loss which may be necessary to protect 
or promote the public health, safety, comfort and con-
venience must always be borne by individuals and cor-
porations. 
If the statute involved in the Richards case had pro-
vided that the innocent owner might recover the value 
of his vehicle from the state, we certainly would not say 
that the payment amounted to a mere gratuity. Animals 
and buildings may be destroyed without compensation to 
the owner where such action is necessary to prevent the 
spread of disease or fire, but legislation authorizing such 
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value of his property does not contravene Article III, 
Sections 51 and 52 of our Constitution. Chambers v. 
Gilbert Tex. Civ. App., 42 S.W. 630 (wr. ref.). More 
nearly like the question involved in the present case was 
the one considered in City of Beaumont v. Priddie, Tex. 
Civ. App., 65 S.W. 2d 434 (judgments of lower courts 
reversed and cause dismissed for mootness, Texas & 
N. 0. R. Co. v. Priddie, 127 Tex. 629, 95 S.W. 2d 1290), 
which involved the validity of a contract whereby the 
city agreed to pay part of the expense incurred by a rail-
road in constructing underpasses where its tracks 
crossed public streets at grade. The judgment of the 
trial court enjoining the city from carrying out the 
agreement was affirmed on grounds which are not ma-
terial here. It was also contended by the appellees that 
the city's contribution to the cost of construction came 
within the inhibition of Article XI, Section 3, of the 
Constitution, which prohibits a municipal corporation 
from making any appropriation or donation to a private 
corporation. In disposing of this question, the Court of 
Civil Appeals at Austin, speaking through Chief Justice 
McClendon, said : 
"But, although the state may compel the rail-
road to bear the entire expense of grade separa-
tion, nevertheless it is not required to do so, but 
may bear the entire expense itself, or apportion it 
between itself and the railroad. While this power 
is generally recognized, the cases in which it has 
been challenged as violative of constitutional pro-
visions similar to those in this state inhibiting the 
state or its subdivisions from making donations 
to private corporations or individuals appear to 
be rare. Those in which the question has been con-
sidered uniformly hold that state or municipal 
contribution to the expense does not come \vithin 
such inhibition. Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Canal 
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Board, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 N.E. 964, Ann. Cas. 
1913C, 1228; Brooke v. Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123, 
29 A. 387, 24 L. R. A. 781. We think the sound-
ness of this holding cannot seriously be questioned. 
While the paramount duty rests upon the railroad 
to provide originally and thereafter to maintain 
the safety of the crossing, regardless of the re-
quirements in that regard brought about by 
changes in conditions, still the interest therein of 
the state as representative of the public is such 
that the expenditure of public funds. in this re-
gard is a legitimate governmental function, and 
does not properly fall within the designation of a 
donation of public funds to a private enterprise. 
In the infinite variety of situations which present 
themselves, the state may properly make an ad-
justment of the expense, as the peculiar equities 
of each situation may in its judgment dictate. In 
this matter the judgment of the state is supreme, 
subject to judicial review only in case of fraudu-
lent or arbitrary abuse of the power." 
·It is important to remember that utility facilities 
are not placed in public streets. merely for the convenience 
of private stockholders. As stated in Jones v. Carter, 
Tex. Civ. App., 101 S.W. 514 (wr. ref.), "light, sewers, 
gas and water works are among the common necessities 
of modern cities, and it is a matter of common knowledge 
that such plants cannot be constructed and operated with-
out running the lines and mains along or across the 
streets. They are some of the common uses to which 
streets are necessarily devoted." It is the interest of the 
public in receiving utility services which supports the 
right of utilities to use streets and highways for that 
purpose in the first place. See State v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 338 Mo. 617, 92 S.W. 2d 612. 
Highway construction is clearly a governmental 
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purpose for which public funds may properly be ex-
pended. See Texas Constitution, Article XVI, Section 24; 
Robbins v. Limestone County, supra. The removal of 
utility facilities which stand in the way is as necessary 
to the accomplishment of that purpose as the removal 
of trees and hills. Unlike trees and hills, however, the 
utility lines must be moved and restored at another 
location if the people are to receive services that are 
essential to the protection of their health and safety. 
The public thus has a direct and immediate interest in 
the relocation of utility facilities which would otherwise 
interfere with highway improvements, and payment of 
the non-betterment cost thereof does not constitute a 
donation of public funds or an appropriation for a pri-
vate purpose. As pointed out in Wilson v. City of Long 
Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A. 2d 837, "Utilities are neces-
sary adjuncts of the public welfare. Their business 
~perations and their property have been subject to special 
legislative treatment for many years. * * In the present 
context, uninterrupted service during and after the 
completion of the * * project is vital. Where removal 
of facilities is necessary, it is important that relocation 
be as expeditious and controversy-free as possible. That 
end is intimately related to the achievement of the over-
all public purpose * *." 
If the non-betterment cost of doing this is not paid 
by the state, the same must be borne· initially by the 
utilities. In most instances the burden would ultimately 
fall upon local tax payers and rate payers, who must 
also provide part of the taxes used for highway construc-
tion. These individuals, who receive no special benefit 
from the highways, would thus be required to contribute 
twice to the overall cost of the undertaking. Under these 
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circumstances, it was for the Legislature to determine 
whether to equalize the burden by paying the entire 
expense from state funds. In the words of Mr. Justice 
Cardozo, "this is a case where the Legislature, by action 
looking to the future, has defined the terms of equity and 
justice upon which it will go into an enterprise. In 
fixing these conditions, the Legislature has a wide dis-
cretion. * * Courts will not revise its judgment unless 
there has been manifest abuse. * * The state was about 
to execute a great public work. It saw that in the doing 
of that work there would be destruction of private prop-
erty. Much of the damage would be damnum absque 
injuria. Nonetheless it would be damage. The result 
would be inequality in the distribution of public burdens. 
Some vvould pay more dearly than others in proportion 
to benefits received. This inequality the Legislature, 
fixing in advance the conditions of the undertaking, had 
the power to correct. It might refuse to launch an enter-
prise at the price of hardship and oppression. There was 
power to destroy and leave the loss where it might fall. 
There was also power to pay for the destruction, and 
thereby reestablish some uniformity of proportion be-
tween benefits and burdens. The question was for the 
Legislature whether the equity of compensation was 
strong enough to merit recognition. We cannot hold it 
to be illusory." Oswego & S. R. Co. v. State, supra.1 
In our opinion, Article 6674w-4 is a reasonable exercise 
by the state of its power to assume the financial burdens 
1 In citing and quoting from this case, we are not to be understood as 
approving the New York rule that the legislature may recognize claims 
founded on equity and justice even though the same could not have been 
enforced in a court of law if the state were subject to suit. See Lehigh Valley 
R. Co. v. Canal Board, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 N.E. 964. 
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of public improvements, and does not violate any of the 
constitutional provisions mentioned above. 
The statute does not grant an irrevocable or uncon-
trollable special privilege, because the law can be repealed 
at any time and in that event there will be no right to 
reimbursement for relocation expenses thereafter in-
curred. It should be noted, however, that if the relocated 
lines are placed on right of way owned by the utility, 
the cost of acquiring said right of way is not properly 
attrfbutable to such relocation within the meaning of the 
Act. If the .state should pay this cost, it would be in the 
position of buying for the utility that which it would be 
required to take under the power of eminent domain in 
the event the land where the relocated lines are placed 
were ever needed for a different and superior public use. 
This would be an unconstitutional gift for a private pur-
pose, and the statute should, if reasonably possible, be 
_given a construction that will not render it invalid. 
County of Cameron v. Wilson, -~---- Tex. ______ , 326 S.W. 2d 
162. 
By the terms of Article 6674w-4, reimbursement 
for relocation costs is conditioned upon the eligibility 
of such relocation for Federal participation. Petitioner 
argues that a change in the conditions and extent of Fed-
er~l participation would modify the legal obligation of 
the State of Texas to utility owners, both private and 
municipal, and that the statute is therefore an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power to the United 
States, its Congress and agencies. Respondents insist 
that the statute is merely contingent legislation similar 
to that which was considered in The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. 
( 7 Cranch) 382, and City of San Antonio v. Jones, 28 
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Tex. 19. We do not agree with either of these conten-
tions. 
The law was complete when it left the hands of the 
Legislature and was not to become operative upon the 
happening of some contingency or future event. A change 
in the percentage of Federal participation will natur-
ally affect the amount which the state receives by way 
of reimbursement, but will not alter in any way the 
obligation of the state to the utilities. No part of the 
expense will be paid by the state, of course, if the reloca-
tion is not eligible for Federal participation, but in mak-
ing this provision the Legislature was simply establish-
ing a class of relocation projects for. which the utilities 
will be entitled to reimbursement. It is our opinion that. 
the classification is reasonable and that the law is not 
unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power. 
The cost of relocation is to be paid out of the State 
Highway F·und, which is derived, in part, from motor 
vehicle registration fees and motor fuel taxes. See 
Articles 6675a-10, 6694, and 7065b-25, Vernon's Ann. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Under the provisions of Article VIII, 
Section 7a, of the Constitution, revenues received from 
these sources may be used only for constructing public 
roadways and for other designated purposes which are 
not material here. Petitioner argues that utility reloca-
tion expense is not part of the cost of highway-construc-
tion ·within the meaning of this provision. The courts· 
of other jurisdictions are rather evenly divided on that 
question. Two have expressed the view that costs of 
relocation cannot be paid with funds. that are authorized 
to be used for highway construction. Opinion of the 
Justices, ______ Me. ______ , 132 A. 2d 440; Mulkey v. Quillian, 
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supra. An equal number have held that the language of 
the Constitution should not be given such a narrow con-
struction. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra; 
Opinion of the Justices, ______ N.H. ______ , 132 A. 2d 613. 
It seems to us that the latter conclusion is sound in prin-
ciple and supported by the better reasoning. Article 
VIII, Section 7a, does not define or restrict the meaning 
of "constructing" in any way. The term obviously does 
not embrace merely the ·clearing and grading of the road-
bed and the pouring of concrete, but includes "everything 
appropriately connected with, and necessarily incidental 
to, the complete accomplishment of the general purpose 
for which the fund exists." See 40 C.J.S. Highways 
§ 176 h (2) (a). In Bell County v. Lightfoot, 104 Tex. 346, 
138 S.W. 381, it was held that the power given a gov-
ernmental agency to issue bonds· for constructing a public 
improvement carried with it the further authority to 
obtain funds in that manner for repairing and maintain• 
ing the completed improvement. 
The constitutionality of a statute must be sustained 
by the courts unless its invalidity is apparent beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 
323, 198 S.W. 2d 424. It has already been pointed out 
that the use of public ways for the installation of utility 
lines and mains is one of the proper and common purposes· 
to· which roads and streets are necessarily devoted, al-
though their principal and primary use is for travel and 
transportation. The relocation of such facilities is made 
necessary by and is an integral part of the highway im-
provement program. If the Legislature determines, as 
it has in this instance, .that the non-betterment cost 
xvi 
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thereof should be paid by the state, it is our opinion that 
the same is properly attributable to highway construc-
tion within the meaning of the Constitution. 




Jan. 6, 1960 
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